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COMMENTS
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON ORDINARY
CONTRACTS
Punitive damages historically may not be recovered for breach
of contract.1 Montana by statute has not allowed punitive damages
for breach of an obligation "arising from contract" since at least
1895.2
It would be wrong, however, to assume that the law of punitive
damages on contract is settled.8 One recent change in Montana is
the distinction now made for the purpose of punitive damages be-
tween insurance contracts and other ordinary contracts.4 Punitive
damages may be recovered for breach of an insurance contract
which also constitutes breach of a duty imposed upon the parties
by statute.8 Punitive damages on insurance contracts are covered
in the preceding article of this issue,6 and so will be discussed only
briefly here.
The subject of this comment is punitive damages on ordinary
contracts. Section I deals briefly with historical background of pu-
nitive damages in contract actions. Section II discusses the devel-
opment of Montana case law. Section III suggests how to identify
and establish a valid claim for punitive damages arising out of a
contract. Also, section III traces the definition of fraud as it has
developed through Montana punitive damages tort cases.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Punitive damages, also called exemplary damages, are in-
tended primarily to punish a party in a civil suit for a wrong done
to society as well as to the plaintiff and to serve as an example for
1. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 245 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); 11
S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1340 (1920); Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Con-
tract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. R . 207 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Sullivan].
2. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 27-1-221 (1979) (formerly
RvisED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) (hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 17-208, enacted in
1895).
3. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 221.
4. First Security Bank v. Goddard, - Mont. -. , 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1979).
5. Id.
6. Harman, An Insurer's Liability for the Tort of Bad Faith, 42 MONT. L. REV. 67
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Harman].
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the over-all good of society.7 Since parties to a contract create con-
tractual obligations by an exercise of will, and failure to discharge
these self-imposed obligations does not inevitably violate objective
standards of societal conduct, the needs of society which justify an
award of punitive damages generally are not present in a contract
situation.8 It is also thought that since damages are more readily
calculable when based on a contract, there is seldom a need or jus-
tification to extend the award to non-pecuniary losses in order to
fully compensate the injured party.e The general rule against puni-
tive damages on contract originated in England, and was carried
over to the United States possibly as a result of tradition more
than definitive legal reasoning. 10
Several exceptions to the general rule have developed. The
two oldest exceptions, generally accepted, are breach of a contract
to marry,1 and breach of a contract by a public service company. 2
Some courts allow punitive damages on a contract if there is also a
fiduciary duty between the parties to the contract.13 And in some
7. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 217, 219.
8. Id.; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971); M.S.R. Assocs., Ltd. v. Consoli-
dated Mut. Ins. Co., 58 A.D.2d 859, 396 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1977) (only a private wrong and not a
public right involved); Halpert v. Rosenthal, 107 R.I. 406, 413, 267 A.2d 730, 735 (1970) (In
case of breach of contract, damage resulting from an innocent misrepresentation of a mate-
rial fact relied upon is equally injurious to that resulting from fraud.).
9. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 218; Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found., - Ind. -, 402
N.E.2d 448, 453 (1980) (Well-defined parameters of damages which may be assessed for
breach of contract lend a needed measure of stability and predictability to the free enter-
prise system.). Vallejo v. Jamestown College, 244 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1976).
No damages can be recovered for a breach of contract if they are not clearly ascer-
tainable in both their nature and origin. . . . The damages must be such as may
fairly be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties when
they made the contract .... The injured person ... is not to be put in a better
position by a recovery of damages than he would have been if there had been
performance.
Id. at 758-59.
10. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 208-20.
11. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 245 (1965). See also Sullivan, supra note 1, at 223:
The justification for permitting these awards rests mainly upon the peculiar na-
ture of the interests invaded by breach of contract to marry. Because the damage
suffered by the plaintiff is often uniquely personal, the character of the interest
abused frequently has much more in common with a typical tort action than with
the standard contract action.
12. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 223-24:
English law early recognized that those engaged in public or common callings had
an obligation to serve all applicants for their services .... Legal rules governing
the common callings were shaped by the need to protect the public against ex-
ploitation or oppression by the providers of important public services [which]...
[iun modern society (are] . . . the common carrier or public utility that enjoys
monopoly or quasi-monopoly power.
13. In order for the exception to lie, apparently, there must be a true fiduciary rela-
tionship, e.g., broker-principal, but retail dealer-distributor held not a fiduciary relationship.
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jurisdictions, breach of contract involving fraudulent conduct justi-
fies an exception.
Two methods have developed to find the exception for fraudu-
lent conduct. The first method requires that the contract itself be
breached by fraudulent conduct." The second method awards the
punitive damages on a tort existing independent of the contract
between parties whose relationship was created by the contract."5
With the first method, technically, all that is required to bring
the exception into play is a satisfactory showing that the conduct
breaching the contract was fraudulent, or was accompanied by
fraud.16 Application of this method in a pure sense can signifi-
cantly increase the incidence of punitive damages awards in that
jurisdiction because the possibility of fraudulent conduct cuts
across the whole range of contract relations and because fraud is
often defined liberally.17
With the second method, the punitive damages are not recov-
ered on the actual breach of contract, but rather are found on a
tort independent of the contract. This method, therefore, is not a
true exception to the general rule although it is usually called an
exception by courts which use it."5 If it is applied correctly, no
amount of fraud in the contract transaction will warrant punitive
damages if there is no tort present arising from breach of a duty
separate from the ordinary contractual duty. Such a separate duty
can be present between parties although their relationship is origi-
nally created by the contract.
The second method is difficult to apply because the line of dis-
tinction between contract and tort often cannot be precisely
drawn." The distinction is based on whether the duty breached is
the contractual duty itself or a duty separate from the contract.
Some courts attempt to identify the duty, while others do not dis-
tinguish between the duties but base the distinction between con-
See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 228-29. See also 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 245 (1965).
14. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 229-30.
15. Id. at 236-37.
16. Id. at 231. See also Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found.,__ Ind. -, 402 N.E.2d 448,
454-56 (1980) (Tortious activity is often "mingled" with the breach of contract. Therefore
an independent tort is not a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages. Defendant's mali-
cious state of mind is stressed in the court's findings.).
17. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 229-30.
18. Id. at 236-37; 22 AM. Jui. 2d Damages § 245 (1965). Peterson v. Culver Educ.
Found., - Ind. __, 402 N.E.2d 448, 453 (1980) refers to this method as an exception to the
general rule.
19. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 237-38; Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found., - nd __,
402 N.E.2d 448, 454 (1980).
1981]
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tract and tort on a finding of misfeasance versus nonfeasance.2"
Misfeasance is defective performance of the contract or an active
and intentional type of conduct, while nonfeasance is simply fail-
ure to perform. Courts using the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinc-
tion find the essential tort present in misfeasance.
Differences between these two methods may seem obvious
here but sometimes the cases are not clear. Some courts have con-
fused the two rationales by combining them or by adopting one
while also using language from the other. For example, a court
might adopt the first method but then attempt to justify it by stat-
ing that a tort must be shown in addition to the fraudulent breach
of contract.21 Or, a court might rely on the second method and
base the award of punitive damages on an independent tort but
then also talk about malicious or oppressive breach of the con-
tract.22 When a jurisdiction becomes caught in the grey area be-
tween the two methods there is a characteristic inability to predict
the outcome of an individual case. 3
Overall, if a jurisdiction has retained the general rule against
punitive damages on contract, then the second method requiring
an independent tort is the most direct means to get punitive dam-
ages on contract since it can be accepted alongside the general rule.
Montana has employed this method for insurance contracts, as is
discussed in the preceding article of this issue.2' Neither method,
however, has been used in Montana for ordinary contracts. In-
stead, Montana has gone to a common law doctrine of election of
the form of action by the plaintiff.
II. MONTANA LAW
In Montana if there is breach of a duty other than the con-
tractual duty, the plaintiff, to recover punitive damages, can elect
to affirm the contract and sue on the tort.25 The independent tort
must always involve conduct proscribed in the punitive damages
statute, which states:
When exemplary damages allowed. In any action for a breach of
20. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 239.
21. Id. at 235.
22. Id. at 237; Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found., - Ind. -, 402 N.E.2d 448, 454
(1980).
23. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 235.
24. First Security Bank v. Goddard, - Mont. -, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979), discussed in
Harman, supra note 6, at 67.
25. Dimler v. District Court, 170 Mont. 77, 81, 550 P.2d 917, 920 (1976), citing, 37 AM.
JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 332 (1968).
[Vol. 42
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an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed,
the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for
the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant.26
Westfall v. Motors Insurance Corporation,27 decided in 1962,
was the Montana Supreme Court's first opportunity to construe
the statute as it applies to contracts.28 There plaintiff purchased an
accident insurance policy from defendant on a used automobile.2 9
The maximum coverage of the policy was based on the actual cash
value of the car rather than the amount financed. When plaintiff
submitted a claim to defendant, the adjuster reported as the actual
cash value the amount financed. He also secured from the plaintiff
a release which discharged defendant from further obligation on
the policy by promising that plaintiff would receive "something
[extra] out of it or have a car."8 0 The defendant then paid off the
debt on the car and paid plaintiff only the unearned portion of the
insurance premium.3' Plaintiff sued for compensatory and punitive
damages on fraudulent misrepresentation of the true actual cash
value and also on fraudulent misrepresentation of the terms of the
release.3 2 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff of actual and pu-
nitive damages.3
On appeal the court reversed, stating that the action was on
contract and not within the punitive damages statute. Each of the
fraudulent acts, the court concluded, was breach of an obligation
arising directly from contract, and there was no other basis availa-
ble upon which to award punitive damages. The court considered
the release first since rescission of the release was necessary to re-
instate the original insurance contract.3 4 By statute a release is a
type of contract, 5 and as such is voidable and subject to rescission
for fraud or mistake of fact." The required finding of fraud, to
make a release voidable, can be satisfied by fraudulent procure-
26. MCA § 17-1-221 (1979) (emphasis added).
27. 140 Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96 (1962).
28. Westfall was discussed in Pitch, Punitive Damages for Fraudulent Procurement
of a Release are Prohibited by Statute, 24 MoNT. L. REv. 71 (1962).
29. Westfall, 140 Mont. at 565, 374 P.2d at 97.
30. Id. at 566, 374 P.2d at 97-98.
31. Id., 374 P.2d at 98.
32. Id. at 567, 374 P.2d at 98.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 568, 374 P.2d at 99.
35. MCA § 28-1-601 (1979), cited in Westfall as R.C.M. 1947 § 58-509, provides that
"[a]n obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor,
upon a new consideration, or in writing, with or without new consideration."
36. Westfall, 140 Mont. at 568, 374 P.2d at 98-99.
1981]
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ment of the release because, in Montana, activity during procure-
ment of a contract is part of the whole contract transaction."
Thus, in Westfall, fraud in the procurement of the release was
fraud in the contract itself. The court then relied on a California
case, Crogan v. Metz,3s which held that an award of punitive dam-
ages may not be granted in an action based on breach of contract
even though the breach is willful or fraudulent.3 9 Under applica-
tion of Crogan, the misrepresentation of the terms of the release
did not warrant punitive damages no matter how fraudulent. 0
Also, the court stated, fraudulent procurement of the release was
breach of an obligation arising out of contract, upon which puni-
tive damages are precluded by Montana Code Annotated [herein-
after cited as MCA] § 27-1-221 (1979).
The court's use of Crogan and the punitive damages statute
applied as well to consideration of the original insurance contract.
Misrepresentation of the actual cash value of the car, however will-
ful or fraudulent it may have been, was simply a breach of per-
formance of the terms of the insurance contract. 1 WestfaUi was
confirmed in Montana federal court by Wade v. Great American
Insurance Co.,42 in which defendant refused to pay a claim on a
theft insurance policy.
In 1965, Westfall controlled in Ryan v. Aid, Inc.,4s which in-
volved an agreement for purchase of laundromat machines. Defen-
dant was the seller but plaintiff installed the machines himself.
When he had problems, defendant sent parts and instructions and
an agent, but the machines never did work."" Plaintiff sued on
fraud and breach of contract. The jury was allowed to hear evi-
dence that oral promises were made by defendant before the
purchase that he would install the machines and show plaintiff
how they worked.45 Plaintiff recovered actual and punitive dam-
37. Id. at 569, 374 P.2d at 99 (procurement of contract is part of contract transaction).
Cf., Walker v. Signal Companies, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 3d 982, 149 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126 (1978)
(Punitive damages may be awarded where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to
enter a contract because California distinguishes fraudulent inducement from a breach of
the contract itself.).
38. 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1956).
39. Id. See also American Int'l Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So.2d 567, 569 (Fla. 1976)
(flagrant breach does not constitute tortious fraud and deceit); Deming v. Buckley's Art
Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 246, 253 (W.D. Ark. 1961) (in consideration of alleged misrepresenta-
tions for purpose of rescission of contract, willfulness and maliciousness are unimportant).
40. Westfall, 140 Mont. at 570, 374 P.2d at 99-100.
41. Id. at 570, 374 P.2d at 100.
42. 255 F. Supp. 735, 736 (D.Mont. 1966).
43. 146 Mont. 299, 406 P.2d 373 (1965).
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ages. On appeal, the court stated that, besides violating the parol
evidence rule, oral promises could not be used to prove fraud for
the purpose of punitive damages.40 Oral promises made both prior
to and subsequent to the written contract would all arise out of the
same contract transaction, the later promises being a "continua-
tion" of the initial ones. These promises, if fraudulent, would con-
stitute fraudulent inducement of the contract. In this case, as in
Westfall, fraudulent inducement of contract was breach of the
contract. Thus, punitive damages were not recoverable and evi-
dence pertaining to them was not admissible.47
Plaintiff's right to elect whether the form of action is contract
or tort was recognized in 1953, in Garden City Floral Co. v.
Hunt.45 Citing cases from several other jurisdictions, the Montana
court stated that to find a tort there must be a duty, other than
the duty arising from the contract, which is breached by active
misfeasance rather than passive negligence. "9 Although Garden
City Floral did not involve fraud or punitive damages, the theory
of election is the same as that employed to allow punitive damages
on contract in State ex rel. Dimler v. District Court.50
In Dimler, plaintiffs elected to affirm the terms of the contract
and sue for damages on the independent tort of fraud.5 1 Plaintiffs
were buyers in a real estate contract for deed. Defendants, as sell-
ers, had advertised that the house had two bathrooms and had
made the upstairs bathroom appear to be in use when in fact there
was no plumbing to the second floor of the house. Plaintiffs discov-
ered the fraud the day after they moved in. 2 They wanted to keep
the house, so rather than rescind the sale, plaintiffs affirmed the
contract and sued for damages in fraud." The district court
granted a motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages. Upon
writ of supervisory control, the Montana Supreme Court reinstated
the punitive damages claim. They distinguished Westfall and
Ryan as actions for breach of contract, and allowed Dimler to pro-
ceed in tort.5 4 Westfall and Ryan, the court stated, both involved
rescission as a necessary part of the relief granted to the plaintiff
46. Id. at 303, 406 P.2d at 375.
47. Id.
48. 126 Mont. 537, 543, 255 P.2d 352, 355-56 (1953). See also Fraser v. Clark, 137
Mont. 362, 376, 352 P.2d 681, 688 (1960), and citations therein.
49. 126 Mont. at 543, 255 P.2d at 358 (in a doubtful question between contract and
tort the doubt must be resolved in favor of contract).
50. 170 Mont. 77, 550 P.2d 917 (1976).
51. Id. at 79, 550 P.2d at 918.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 81, 550 P.2d at 919-20.
1981]
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and if rescission is part of the relief the action is on contract. But
if the contract is affirmed, the court went on, the claim for injuries
received from fraudulent actions incident to the contract is in tort.
The plaintiff cannot do both.25 Since the action in Dimler was in
tort, it therefore involved the type of obligation upon which puni-
tive damages are allowed by MCA § 27-1-221 (1979).
Dimler did not change the general rule in Montana against
punitive damages on contract, and three years later, the general
rule was affirmed as to ordinary contracts between businessmen in
First State Bank v. Goddard.56 Goddard involved an insurance
contract governed by the insurance laws of Montana.5 7 It is dis-
cussed at length in the preceding article of this issue.5 8 In Goddard
the court distinguished insurance contracts from other contracts
because the peculiar relationship between parties to the consumer-
held insurance contract warrants special duties on insurers. They
reasoned the insured is usually at an economic disadvantage to the
insurer, the insurer almost always prepares the forms used, and the
insured, often in financial straits, is especially vulnerable to op-
pressive tactics by the insurer.5 9 This rationale came from Battista
v. Lebanon Trotting Association,6" a 1976 Ohio federal court case.
Quoting Battista in Goddard, the Montana court was careful to
include the following statement: "The special considerations exis-
tent in a consumer-held insurance contract do not apply to an or-
55. Id. See also 37 Am. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§ 332-33 (1968); Falls Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Western Concrete, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 495 (D.Mont. 1967) ("It is clear that in
Montana and generally, a party may not pursue both an action for rescission and damages
for deceit or misrepresentation." Id. at 500); Fraser v. Clark, 137 Mont. 362, 376, 352 P.2d
681, 688 (1960).
56. - Mont. -, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
57. The court in Goddard stated:
In Montana, insurance companies insuring credit disability risks have a statutory
duty that exists beyond the insurance contract itself. Their statutory duty under
section 40-4213, R.C.M. 1947, now section 33-21-105 MCA, is that all claims shall
be settled as soon as possible and in accordance with the terms of the insurance
contract . . . .It is the breach of that statutory requirement, a duty independent
of the insurance contract, that gives rise to tort liability in the case at bar.
Thus, the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing with its insureds in the
payment of claims has statutory blessing and authority ....
This Court recognized that a breach of contract might also give rise to an
action in tort in State ex rel. Larson v. District Court (1967), 149 Mont. 131, 136,
423 P.2d 598, 600, when it said: "Thus, in the insurance contract we have a unique
situation; that is, some acts may be both breaches of contract and violations of the
laws of Montana."
- Mont. , 593 P.2d at 1047.
58. Harman, supra note 6, at 67.
59. Goddard, - Mont. -, 593 P.2d at 1047, citing Battista v. Lebanon Trotting
Assoc., 538 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976).
60. 538 F.2d 111, 117-18 (6th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 42
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dinary contract between businessmen . . . ."' Battista followed
the Ohio general rule that breach of an ordinary contract does not
create a tort claim, regardless of motive, and that punitive dam-
ages are not available for breach of contract. 2 The dangers inher-
ent in the insurance contract created by disparity between the par-
ties' positions are not present in an ordinary contract between
businessmen. Thus, Montana, pursuant to Goddard, clearly en-
dorses the traditional rule against punitive damages on contracts
in the case of an ordinary contract.
III. IDENTIFYING AND ESTABLISHING A VALID CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES ON CONTRACT
There are five parts to this section. The first deals with the
importance of pleading with particularity. The second, third, and
fourth parts discuss a progressive analysis which can be made of a
contract case to determine whether a claim for punitive damages
will lie. The questions involved in this analysis are, whether recis-
sion is a necessary part of the relief, whether there is a tort inde-
pendent of the contract, and whether to affirm the contract and
sue on the tort. The fifth part briefly discusses the requirement of
oppression, fraud, or malice in the punitive damages statute which
plaintiff must always satisfy once an independent tort is
established.
A. Pleading
Pleading with great particularity is crucial to a valid claim for
punitive damages arising out of contract. Since many and varied
types of contracts and circumstances can be involved in election of
action, proper notice may often require additional information and
clarity in the complaint. Rule 9(b) of the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that all averments of fraud shall be stated with
particularity. It makes sense that plaintiff's intent to affirm the un-
derlying contract should also be pleaded particularly since it cer-
tainly forms a part or basis of the claim of fraud. To affirm, plain-
tiff should plead all contract terms as written and performed by
61. Goddard, - Mont. -, 593 P.2d at 1047; Battista, 538 F.2d at 118.
62. In Battista, 538 F.2d at 118, the court, citing Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372,
Syl. 1, 136 N.E. 145 (1922), stated:
To hold otherwise would be to abandon the venerable rule that the motive of a
breaching party to a contract is irrelevant to the merit of the promisee's claim,
and would allow parties to convert contract actions into actions in tort by attack-
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the parties. A further reason to plead with particularity is that, as
used in Dimler, the method of election is new in Montana,6 3 and it
can only be to plaintiff's benefit to give defendant and the court
clear notice as to the form of action he is bringing.
B. Rescission
The first determination which must be made in anticipating a
claim for punitive damages on a contract is whether or not rescis-
sion of the contract is part of the plaintiff's relief. As stated in
Dimler," if rescission is part of the relief sought, then the action is
on contract, and punitive damages are not recoverable. Rescission
in a particular case may be required for some reason or may be at
plaintiff's option. When plaintiff has the option, he then can affirm
the contract and sue on a tort. When he cannot avoid rescission,
however, he cannot affirm, and the action must be on contract.
This discussion, although by no means exhaustive, brings out some
general principles about rescission as a remedy and suggests an
analysis which can be used for each particular case to determine
rescission versus affirmation.
Rescission is appropriate to many different types of con-
tracts." The basis of rescission as a remedy for breach of contract
is to restore the parties to the status quo.66 For the injured party
63. Dimler has been cited only once in Van Ettinger v. Pappin, - Mont. -, 588
P.2d 988, 995 (1978) (Plaintiff elected to affirm the contract, as in Dimler, but election was
not allowed because he had notice of the fraud while the contract was executory.).
64. Dimler, 170 Mont. at 81, 550 P.2d at 919.
65. Examples of types of contracts are: General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481
F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973) (parts manufacturing contracts); Associated Hardware Supply Co.
v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1966) (purchase of goods); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1960) (fire insurance contract);
Mooney v. State Farm Ins. Co., 344 F. Supp. 697 (D.N.H. 1972) (employment contract);
Falls Sand & Gravel Co. v. Western Concrete, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 495 (D.Mont. 1967) (sub-
contract for concrete); Deming v. Buckley's Art Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Ark. 1961)
(implied contract to return money obtained by fraud); Walker v. Signal Companies, Inc., 84
Cal. App. 3d 982, 149 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1978) (house construction); Cole v. Associated Constr.
Co., 141 Conn. 49, 103 A.2d 529 (1954) (house construction); Greer v. Williams, 375 So.2d
333 (Fla. App. 1979) (oral contract to buy a racehorse); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332,
220 N.E.2d 767 (1966) (oral contract in medical malpractice); Peterson v. Culver Educ.
Found., - Ind. -, 402 N.E.2d 448 (1980) (teacher employment contract); Chavez v.
Saums, 1 Kan. App. 2d 564, 571 P.2d 62 (1977) (express contract between lawyer and cli-
ent); Letzig v. Rupert, 209 Kan. 143, 495 P.2d 955 (1972) (option contracts); Fraser v. Clark,
137 Mont. 362, 352 P.2d 681 (1960) (real estate contract); J. Dunn & Sons, Inc. v. Paragon
Homes of New England, Inc., 110 N.H. 215, 265 A.2d 5 (1970) (sale contracts-pre-fab
homes, equipment and supplies); Hall Jones Oil Corp. v. Claro, 459 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1969)
(oil and gas leases); Crutcher-Rolfs-Cummings, Inc. v. Ballard, 540 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1976)
(royalties on a patent); Homer v. Ahern, 206 Va. 860, 153 S.E.2d 216 (1967) (real estate
contract).
66. Deming v. Buckley's Art Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 246, 251 (W.D. Ark. 1961).
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to be made whole again is considered a sufficient remedy for even a
fraudulent breach of a contract into which that person entered of
his own free will. Therefore, if rescission is a part of the relief
granted, there theoretically is no need of further compensation or
punishment of the defendant. Certainly, plaintiff should never
plead rescission and an action on an independent tort for the same
contract because of inconsistency between the two."7
Whether rescission is required may be determined in various
ways, several of which are mentioned here. Each individual case
may produce other factors and circumstances which likewise re-
quire rescission. The following are examples from the Montana
cases used in this comment. Some additional points which should
be helpful are briefly mentioned.
Plaintiff should always anticipate that even with careful
pleading the court will look beyond the face of the complaint to
find rescission, as occurred in both Westfall and Ryan.6" Ambigui-
ties between the court's opinions and their actions complicate this
analysis. The Dimler majority seems to say that rescission was spe-
cifically pleaded in Westfall and Ryan.69 But, as pointed out by
the Dimler dissent, there is no indication in the Westfall opinion
or the Ryan opinion that rescission was actually in the prayer for
relief.70
In Westfall, the court looked to applicable statutory law and
to the form of the relief requested by plaintiff. In plaintiff's allega-
tions, as summarized,71 he did plead fraudulent representations of
the terms of the release from liability and of the actual cash value
of his car. The court analyzed the statutory law of a release con-
tract which provided that rescission was the relief available for
fraud on a release.7 Rescission of the release was also necessary to
reach the issue of fraud on the insurance contract. The court did
not say that rescission of the insurance contract was necessary, but
the relief granted to plaintiff was based on the actual cash value
which was a term of the contract. Since the relief granted was
based on the contract, punitive damages could not be recovered.
The court may also consider conduct of the parties as a way to
find rescission of which Ryan and Dimler are both examples. The
67. Id.
68. In a question of contract versus tort, if the question is regarded as a doubtful one,
the doubt must be resolved in favor of contract. Garden City Floral, 126 Mont. at 543, 255
P.2d at 355-56.
69. Dimler, 170 Mont. at 81, 550 P.2d at 919-20.
70. Id. at 84, 550 P.2d at 921.
71. Westfall, 140 Mont. at 567, 374 P.2d at 98.
72. Id. at 568, 374 P.2d at 98-99.
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Ryan opinion is unclear as to plaintiff's position on rescission of
the contract to purchase laundromat machines. However, the same
case was before the court two years later-on a different theory.73
There the court stated that before plaintiff filed the first case on
the original theory he tried to get his money back and to rescind
the contract, and defendant refused .7  The attempt to rescind
probably was in the record of the first case even though the court
did not specifically report it. Although it is impossible to be cer-
tain, the two Ryan cases indicate that plaintiff may be held to any
attempt to rescind made before initiating legal action which at-
tempt appears later in the court record. In Dimler,73 although
again it is not clear from the language of the opinion whether
plaintiffs pleaded the election to affirm, the court stated that they
"chose" to affirm.76 Plaintiffs remained in the house and continued
making payments, which demonstrated their choice to affirm. The
point is that conduct can be conclusive. It can ruin plaintiff's elec-
tion to affirm the contract unless the basis of his form of action is
set out unmistakably in the complaint.77
Another question, different from the above discussion, may
arise in the case of a written contract which contains an express
rescission clause. Can the contract even though it contains the
clause be affirmed for the purpose of punitive damages? Some in-
dication of Montana's attitude in regard to a rescission clause
comes from Dimler78 in which the court cited Horner v. Ahern,79 a
Virginia case, as an instance of correct use of the doctrine of elec-
tion. In Horner, a real estate contract contained a clause which
allowed plaintiffs to rescind the contract if the house were found to
have termite damages. The contract was executed and termite
damage was later discovered by the plaintiffs. They affirmed the
contract and sued for damages in tort. Defendants contended that
to affirm the contract, plaintiffs must affirm the rescission clause,
and so would be bound to rescission as the only remedy for termite
73. Ryan v. Ald, Inc., 149 Mont. 367, 427 P.2d 53 (1967).
74. Id. at 369, 427 P.2d at 55.
75. Dimler, 170 Mont. at 79, 550 P.2d at 918.
76. Id.
77. Cf. Deming v. Buckley's Art Gallery, 196 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Ark. 1960).
The court is of the opinion that the complaint sets up all the essentials necessary
to support an action for rescission of the contract on the ground of fraud, and that
plaintiff, having elected to repudiate or rescind the contract, cannot recover puni-
tive damages in addition to the purchase price. (emphasis added.)
Id. at 253. The court found rescission even though the parties had not specifically requested
it.
78. Dimler, 170 Mont. at 83, 550 P.2d at 920.
79. 206 Va. 860, 153 S.E.2d 216 (1967).
[Vol. 42
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damage. The Virginia court, however, allowed plaintiffs to use the
rescission clause as proof of defendant's duty to make full disclo-
sure of termite damage and did not require the operation of the
clause to be affirmed since the clause was meant to become opera-
tive only if the damage was discovered before final execution of the
contract." If Montana, therefore, relies on Horner in a case involv-
ing a contract with a rescission clause, the clause should not neces-
sarily mandate the plaintiff's form of action. The court should be
willing to look at the purpose of the clause and the time it was
intended to be operative. A plaintiff in such a case who leaves the
court to its own devices cannot rely on the result, so he should
determine exactly how to use the clause and plead that intent
carefully.
Three further points on rescission are worth mentioning. First,
when a court finds the action to be on contract because of rescis-
sion based on conduct, the act involved upon which rescission is
based can be either fraudulent or innocent.81 Second, in some cases
plaintiff may be locked-in to an action on contract, because the
contract is fully executed and the amount of plaintiff's injury due
to defendant's breach is the exact amount of the promised per-
formance.2 Lastly, full or partial performance of a contract may
render rescission impossible. For example, if goods purchased on
contract for resale are sold by the time the case is settled, the par-
ties cannot be restored to their positions prior to the contract.8
In summary, if final analysis of the contract shows that rescis-
sion is necessary or that the court will likely find rescission as part
of plaintiff's relief, then the claim must be on contract, and puni-
tive damages cannot be recovered. If rescission is at plaintiff's
choice, however, the contract can be affirmed, the first step neces-
sary in claiming punitive damages.
C. The Independent Duty
If the contract can be affirmed, and if the plaintiff desires to
80. Id. at 867-68, 153 S.E.2d at 221.
81. Halpert v. Rosenthal, 107 R.I. 406, 413, 267 A.2d 730, 733-34 (1970).
82. Westfall, 140 Mont. at 567, 374 P.2d at 98 (plaintiff was actually damaged $115,
the difference between the actual cash value of the car and the amount paid by defendant).
Cf. Dimler, 170 Mont. at 79, 550 P.2d at 918 (Plaintiff and defendant had both performed
the terms of the contract for deed. Plaintiff, in keeping the house, was damaged by loss of
value to the house because of the plumbing.).
83. Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir.
1966). Because the contract cannot be rescinded, "fraud, as alleged [in this case] is an inde-
pendent action, the recovery for which may be set off against or may even exceed the
amounts due and owing under the contract." Id. at 120-21.
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affirm it, the second step is to identify some duty separate from
the contractual duty which defendant has breached. The addi-
tional duty must arise out of the same relationship and same set of
facts as the contractual duty.84 The additional duty may be one
allowed at common law, or one imposed by statute."' It is advisable
to look over all statutory law which could apply, since a statutory
duty recently enacted might support an action in tort. If an inde-
pendent duty can be identified, then plead the relationship be-
tween the parties and the facts supporting breach of the indepen-
dent duty by the defendant.
D. Election of Tort
If there is breach of a duty independent of the contractual
duty, and plaintiff has decided to affirm the contract and sue on
the tort, intent to elect the tort should be pleaded precisely. Ordi-
narily, at common law, plaintiff has broad freedom to elect which
form of action to proceed on, and determination of whether the
action is on contract or in tort is controlled not by technical form
but by substance.8 6 Defendant, to be safe, should force an election
of remedies if plaintiff's intent is not clear from the complaint.
The action of rescission on contract and the action of fraud in the
inducement may not be so incompatible as to compel election if
the defendant does not force the issue, 7 However, plaintiff may
not have to make the election until the trial.88
84. The court in Bankers Trust Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 106 (9th
Cir. 1960) (cited in Dimler), stated:
ITihis doctrine of election of remedies applies only to choosing between different
remedies allowed by law on the same state of facts, where the party has but one
cause of action, one right infringed, one wrong to be redressed. "The doctrine does
not require election between distinct causes of action arising out of separate and
distinct facts." (citation omitted.)
Id. at 110. See also 18 Am. JuR. Election of Remedies § 11 (1938).
Bankers Trust Co. also states that an action on a contract induced by fraud is not
inconsistent with an action for damages for deceit, and that suit on a contract and a suit for
fraud in inducing the contract are two different causes of action with separate and consis-
tent remedies. This view is certainly more flexible than that of Westfall which held that
fraud in the procurement of a contract is in fact a breach of the contract itself. The Mon-
tana court, in citing Bankers Trust Co. with approval, may be loosening somewhat on the
question of punitive damages on ordinary contracts along the same vein as the Goddard
treatment of insurance contracts.
85. See, e.g., Chavez v. Saums, 1 Kan. App. 2d 564, 571 P.2d 62 (1977) (statutory duty
imposed on lawyer-client relationship).
86. Towns of Madbury & Lee v. State, 115 N.H. 196, 198, 340 A.2d 103, 105 (1975);
Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 335, 220 N.E.2d 767, 769 (1966).
87. Fraser v. Clark, 137 Mont. 362, 377, 352 P.2d 681, 688 (1960).
88. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Endicott Circuit, 55 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303
(1945). "One who is guilty of fraud has no option to insist that the aggrieved party sue ex
[Vol. 42
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An interesting question arises if a contract cannot be fully per-
formed at the time fraud is discovered and the election must be
made. Can plaintiff affirm the unperformed contract? The test to
determine whether the contract can be affirmed before fully per-
formed is whether plaintiff has in fact acquired an equitable inter-
est in the property which is the subject of the contract.8 9 If plain-
tiff has an equitable interest, he may continue with performance,
treat the contract as affirmed, and elect to sue for damages. It
would be unfair to require him to wait until the contract is fully
performed because the claim might then be barred by the statute
of limitation.90 This general principle should apply to any contract
involving installment payments. One example is an option contract
in which an equitable interest is acquired by plaintiff because in-
stallments paid are applied to the eventual purchase.9 1 By compar-
ison, no equitable interest is acquired in a "pure option" contract
which is executed by only one payment made within a specific pe-
riod of time.2 If fraud is discovered in the procurement of a pure
option contract which is still wholly executory, the plaintiff cannot
affirm and elect a tort for damages.93
In conclusion, once plaintiff has affirmed the contract and the
action is in tort, the case will proceed for recovery of punitive dam-
ages as would any ordinary tort action. The action is no longer on
contract. The contract simply forms the basis for the relationship
between parties.
E. Statutory Requirement
If plaintiff elects to claim damages on a tort arising out of a
contract relation, to recover punitive damages, he must prove that
defendant was "guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or
presumed, . . ." as required by MCA § 27-1-221 (1979). If the
Montana court has been rather conservative in distinguishing con-
tract from tort, it has been quite liberal in defining the conduct
required to recover punitive damages on a tort. A definite broaden-
ing of fraud, oppression and malice is seen through tort cases in
Montana involving punitive damages.9
contractu and not ex delicto so as to eliminate the incriminating charge." Id.
89. Letzig v. Rupert, 209 Kan. 143, 147, 495 P.2d 955, 958 (1972).
90. Id. at 148, 495 P.2d at 958-59.
91. Id. at 147, 495 P.2d at 958.
92. Id., 495 P.2d at 959.
93. Id. See also Van Ettinger v. Pappin, - Mont. -, 588 P.2d 988, 995 (1978).
94. Montana tort cases involving punitive damages:
Oppression is not only unlawful, but is characterized by circumstances which are crimi-
nal, wanton, brutal, reckless or grossly fraudulent. Luther v. Lee, 62 Mont. 174, 179, 204 P.
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An award of punitive damages is in any case extraordinary,
and plaintiff is never entitled to it as a matter of right regardless of
how bad the injury.9 5 There must be something more alleged and
proven then mere negligence.
In estimating the amount of exemplary damages the jury is to
consider public good in the restraint of others from wrongdoing
and punishment of the offender, and may consider the defendant's
wealth and pecuniary ability."
IV. CONCLUSION
A claim for punitive damages arising out of contract should be
placed before the court with careful attention to every element
supporting the election of action in tort. The elements of the claim
which, at a minimum, should appear in the complaint are:
1. An introductory statement of intent to elect an action for dam-
ages on a tort independent of the contract between the parties;
2. The relationship of the parties, as shown by,
a. terms of the contract involved,
b. performance of the contract by the parties,
c. decision not to rescind the contract; if applicable, reasons
why contract cannot be rescinded,
d. decision to affirm the contract;
3. The election of action on the independent tort, by,
a. identification of the duty between the parties indepen-
365, 367 (1922). Oppression can be cruelty, severity, domination or excessive use of author-
ity. Ramsbacher v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 488, 261 P. 273, 276 (1927). Oppression in busi-
ness tactics can be inferred, and where punitive damages are sought, motives of the defen-
dant become the most material subject of inquiry. Security Bank of Harlem v. Kittleson,
149 Mont. 183, 187-88, 425 P.2d 72, 74 (1967). A sufficient motive is "ill will." Ramsbacher,
80 Mont. at 489, 261 P. at 276.
Malice may be proved directly or indirectly. Malice need not necessarily proceed from a
spiteful, malignant or revengeful disposition, but may be conduct injurious to another pro-
ceeding from an ill-regulated mind, not sufficiently cautious before it occasions injury to
another. Ramsbacher, 80 Mont. at 487, 261 P. at 276. Malice includes an act conceived in
mischief, or of criminal indifference to civil obligations, or which is conscious of existing
conditions from which injury or illness would likely result. Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96
Mont. 92, 111, 28 P.2d 862, 869-70 (1934). An act of malice may consist of or be shown by
the continuation of a course of conduct known by defendant to be unlawful and to cause
injury. Cashin, 96 Mont. at 112, 28 P.2d at 869-70; First Security Bank v. Goddard,
Mont. -, 593 P.2d 1040, 1048 (1979). Malice may be disregard of injury that might be
inflicted to further economic gain of the defendant. Cashin, 96 Mont. at 113, 28 P.2d at 869-
70; Truzzolino Food Products Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 108 Mont. 408, 420, 91 P.2d 415,
419 (1939). Malice-in-law may be implied from behavior which is unjustifiable. Cherry-Bur-
rell Co. v. Thatcher, 107 F.2d 65, 69 (9th Cir. 1940); Goddard, - Mont. -, 593 P.2d at
1049; Cashin, 96 Mont. at 111, 28 P.2d at 869-70.
95. Gagnier v. Curran Constr. Co., 151 Mont. 468, 479-80, 443 P.2d 894, 900 (1968).
96. Ramsbacher v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 489, 261 P. 273, 277 (1927).
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dent of the contractual duty,
b. statements alleging the tort of breach of the independent
duty,
c. intent to elect an action for damages on the tort; and,
4. A claim for actual and punitive damages on the tort, including,
a. allegations of injury for purpose of actual damages,
b. the punitive damages statute, MCA § 27-1-221 (1979),
c. allegations of conduct satisfying the requirement of the
statute,
d. prayer for actual and punitive damages.
Laura Lee
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